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Abstract 
The feeble results of liberalization policies in Latin America are explained in terms of a multiple 
steady state model including a dynamic human development trap, endogenous technological change, 
technology transfer and trade. Divergent and convergent steady states, with and without a human 
development trap, exist under both autarchy and free trade. The model explains why import 
substitution is inferior to export promotion. While globalization is a necessary condition for 
convergence to development, it is not sufficient. Both trade and foreign direct investment create 
innovation assymetries hindering lagging countries that need to be balanced with export promotion 
and technological transfer for their successful integration with the global economy. In addition, so 
long as the human development trap persists, unskilled and skilled workers will have a conflict of 
interest between supporting human capital investment and innovation. If only innovation is 
supported, the human capital trap will persist. If mainly human capital investment is pursued, 
technology levels will fall behind; switching to innovation will be necessary eventually. The world 
growth rate is maximized by regulating globalization so as to attain development in all countries. 
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 1 Introduction
In the Latin American context, a society-wide reevaluation of globalization
is currently underway. The pro-market liberalization policies that have been
followed for a decade and a half have been only mildly successful. These poli-
cies have essentially followed the Washington Consensus, consisting mainly of
opening to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), maintaining macroeco-
nomic stability, and entrusting economic development to market functioning.
These policies were established as a response to the Latin American debt cri-
sis in the 80’s, in recognition of the demise of import substitution. The East
Asian economies had espoused export promotion and experienced a transi-
tion to development. The expectation was that liberalization could put Latin
American economies on the same path. Widespread dissatisfaction with the
results has shifted economic policies towards government intervention for di-
rect poverty alleviation in a series of countries.
An economic explanation is needed that can answer to this reality. Why
was export promotion better than import substitution? Yet, why have the
results of liberalization been meager? What role does the high level of in-
equality in Latin America play? Why do millions not believe in market-
guided policies? Why is globalization perceived as unfair? Where to go from
here to address the problems of poverty and development? The objective of
this chapter is to provide just such an explanation, fully grounded in eco-
nomic theory. To do so, I combine several important strands of research on
economic growth, human development, and the role early child development.
1.1 Trade, technological change and economic growth
The ﬁrst strand of research I draw from is research on economic growth. Over
a decade of research has reached the consensus that diﬀerences in income per
capita between countries are mainly due to diﬀerences in technology.1 Thus,
economic growth is mainly and above all the process through which techno-
logical levels of production rise.2 Hence to understand the impact of global-
1See Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005, pages 1-2) for references to studies attributing
cross-country diﬀerences in per-capita GDP to diﬀerences in productivity.
2Schumpeterian analysis of endogenous technological change ﬁrst concentrated on R&D
in developed countries as the source of economic growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1988, 1992)
and convergence (Howitt, 2000). It can also explain convergence clubs, underdevelopment
and divergence (Howitt and Mayer, 2005; Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005).
2ization on economic growth, it is necessary to understand how technological
change takes place under trade and FDI.
I address here the question, how does the international allocation of pro-
duction under trade and FDI, which has been studied extensively, aﬀect the
international allocation of innovation?3 This question is examined by Mayer-
Foulkes (2006a), who ﬁnds that standard trade theory implies the following
natural, real, macroeconomic principle4 governing the international alloca-
tion of innovation under trade. Under trade, the volume of innovative sectors
that a country can dominate (and consequently, under certain conditions, its
rate of technological change) is proportional, ceteris paribus, to its produc-
tive capacity. Suppose that the economy consists of a continuum of sectors,
whose production involves distinct technologies and comparative advantages
between countries. Lagging economies with low levels of productivity will
only be able to cover world demand for a small number of sectors. Hence
in lagging economies technological change will be limited to a small set of
sectors, implying low returns to investment in technological change, even
after taking technology transfer into account. Hence free trade introduces
innovation imbalances between countries.
The result is extended to include FDI, a salient feature of globalization
both in the 19th and 20th Centuries, in Mayer-Foulkes (2006b). When foreign
investors produce abroad to beneﬁt from cheap labor and cheap resources, as
their proﬁts rise so do their incentives to innovate. Moreover, innovation in
the sectors they occupy in host countries is crowded out by their unassailable
competition. Thus FDI generates asymmetric incentives to innovation that
favor leading countries and compound the innovation imbalances introduced
by trade. Technology transfer from FDI, which can play a very signiﬁcant
role favoring economic growth in the host country, tends to occurs with
high enough intensity only under appropriate regulation or negotiation. It
follows that development and underdevelopment persist as diﬀerent steady
states under globalization. Both this result and the previous one on trade
are strong theoretical results, relying only on the assumptions commonly
used in models of trade and of endogenous technological change, and not on
assumed asymmetries between countries, which underlie most explanations
3Innovation is broadly understood to include research and development as well as
imitation and technology adoption.
4By economic principle I mean a result that can be proved from microeconomic as-
sumptions in a series of contexts, such as the existence of general equilibrium, and the
welfare theorems.
3of underdevelopment.
These theoretical results can explain the simultaneous historical emer-
gence from stagnation to modern economic growth, and the appearance of
underdevelopment, or the Great Divergence (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a). De-
velopment and underdevelopment appeared and were stable, and the Great
Divergence proceeded, not only under free trade but also under FDI through
the First Great Age of Globalization (approximately from the 1820’s to 1914),
and up to the present (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006b). The results apply equally well
to the present era of globalization, which accelerated since the early 1980’s.
Since technological leaders trade, their innovators enjoy global incentives
for innovation. Thus steady states for closed economies will be lower. Open-
ness is therefore a necessary condition for development, for all except possibly
the largest countries. As a consequence, an import substitution strategy is
likely to exhaust itself when technology reaches levels requiring world mar-
ket incentives for innovation. An export promotion strategy will not hit
these limits. But openness is not a suﬃcient condition for development. Ce-
teris paribus, under market forces only economies not lagging too far behind
converge to the developed steady state. For smaller and more backward
countries market forces must be augmented with export promotion and tech-
nology adoption to provide enough push for a change of steady state.
1.2 Human development and economic growth
The second strand of research I draw from is historical research on the
strong, long-term, mutual impact between human development and economic
growth. This research attributes about a third of long-term economic growth
to improvements in health, that is, to human development. As economic de-
velopment took place, tremendous changes in human health occurred. Life
expectancy and average adult height and weight rose tremendously.5 The
synergism between technological and physiological improvements has pro-
duced a dynamic, long-term, culturally transmitted form of human evolution
that is biological but not genetic, called by Fogel (2002) technophysio evolu-
tion.T h e t e r m human development includes here the long-term dimension
5Average stature rose from 164 to 181 cm in Holland between 1860 and 2002 and from
161 to 173 cm in France and Norway between 1705 and 1975. Average weight rose from
46 to 73 kg in Norway and France, 1705 to 1975. Life expectancy rose from 41 to 78 years
in England between 1841 and 1998; and from 29 to 60 years in India between 1930 and
1990. (Fogel, 2002; Cervellati, Matteo and Uwe Sunde, 2003.)
4of change.
A third strand of research underlines the intergenerational nature of hu-
man development. Microeconomic studies have found that early child devel-
opment (ECD) is a crucial link in the intergenerational transmission of so-
cioeconomic status and in the adult correlation between health and income.
Using the 1958 National Child Development Study, which follows all children
born in Great Britain in the week of March 3, 1958, Case, Fertig and Paxson,
(2003) ﬁnd that, controlling for parental income, education and social sta-
tus, children who experience poor health have signiﬁcantly lower educational
attainment, and signiﬁcantly lower average adult health and earnings. More
speciﬁcally, Heckman and Carneiro (2003) identify ECD as a crucial stage of
investment in human capital formation, with especially high returns.
Now, it is a commonly accepted fact that investment in human develop-
ment in general and ECD in particular are characterized by market failures,
in so far as the level of these investments depends heavily on parental wealth,
rather than on the returns to human capital investment. Thus, from the eco-
nomic point of view, the investment process sustaining human development
is characterized by market failures. Human development can be understood
as an intergenerational process of human capital accumulation, slowed by the
presence of market failures limiting the necessary investment, in which early
child development plays a critical role.6
1.3 Globalization and development
To analyze the interaction of human development and economic growth under
globalization, I construct a human development trap model representing an
intergenerational poverty trap in human capital investment, and set it in the
context of trade and endogenous technological change.
I ﬁrst describe the human development trap model in some detail. It is an
overlapping generations model in which altruistic parents make their children
a bequest. A high enough bequest provides them with the opportunity for
an indivisible investment in human capital. In the present context, this
investment acquires both skills and the current human development potential.
If the bequest is too low, the absence of credit markets makes the investment
impossible. The construction closely follows Galor and Zeira’s (1993) well
6For an extensive discussion and references on human development and economic
growth, and the role of child development, see Mayer-Foulkes, D. (2007).
5known, simple, poverty trap model, building upon it in two ways.
First, the usual assumption of increasing returns to human capital is re-
moved. Instead, investment indivisibilities and the absence of credit markets
lead to an undersupply of human capital. Under the assumption that skilled
and unskilled labor are complementary, undersupply implies that skills com-
mand extraordinary returns, deﬁned as higher returns than the interest rate.
Second, a dynamic trap is deﬁned, which subsists under economic growth.
Poverty trap models are usually static and therefore unrealistic in the long-
term. Here the trap deﬁnes two population classes. One is skilled, attains
the current human development potential, and is able to bequeath its chil-
dren with the next generation’s human development potential. The other is
unskilled, lives beneath the human development potential, and is unable to
bequeath it. Yet both experience income growth as technology rises through
time.7 At lower levels of development, human capital may be thought to be
more intensive in nutrition and health, while at higher levels, successively
higher levels of education become a more important component. This com-
bination of inequality and growth is consistent with the extraordinary per-
sistence of within-country inequality, at widely diﬀerent income levels and
growth rates.8
I assume that, because of the non-marketable beneﬁts of human develop-
ment, including lifelong health, knowledge for living and life expectancy, the
whole population will opt for human capital investment if given the oppor-
tunity. The trap exists if the proportion of unskilled workers is high enough
that human capital is undersupplied. If instead the trap disappears and skills
become oversupplied, some skilled workers will work at unskilled jobs and the
whole population will attain the current human development potential.
Mayer-Foulkes (2007) presents strong evidence for the existence of such a
human development trap in contemporary Mexico, including extraordinary
returns to education, high returns to ECD, and a multiple-peaked distribu-
tion of human capital across households. In fact, extraordinary returns to
education, deﬁned as returns signiﬁcantly higher than OECD levels, exist, on
average, throughout the underdeveloped world.9 This constitutes evidence
7Income growth does not make class diﬀerences trivial or irrelevant. At a 2% growth
rate, a proportional class income gap of 4 represents a 70 year lag.
8As Kanbur (2005) states: “There is no statistical correlation between changes in per
capita income and changes in inequality, taking countries as the unit of observation.”
9See Tables 1 and 2, Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002). For a full discussion see
Mayer-Foulkes (2007).
6for the existence of a human development poverty trap or prolonged tran-
sition (when the poor need several generations to attain the local human
development potential) in non-OECD Asia, Latin America and Africa.
The human development trap model is set in the context of trade and
endogenous technological change by means of a reduced form expression in-
cluding the following components. 1) Human capital raises production levels
and contributes to technological change by increasing the resources for inno-
vation. 2) Under trade, each sector produces for the global market and has
higher resources for innovation. 3) The operation of comparative advantage
also increases resources for innovation. 4) The transfer of ideas, which may
rise under trade, also contributes to convergence. 5) Specialization under
trade implies that the number of productive sectors in each country, where
innovation occurs, is proportional to each economy’s GDP, once comparative
advantage and innovation are taken into account). 6) The productivity of in-
novation investment in each country is higher when more sectors are involved
in innovation.10
The result is an analysis of the interaction of multiple steady states across
countries in the context of globalization, with the human development trap
occurring within countries.
1.4 Development and Underdevelopment:
distinct steady states
To see how the full model deepens the discussion on human development
and economic growth, let us return to the comparison of East Asia and Latin
America. Comparing the performance of the two regions, Birdsall, Ross &
Sabot (1997) stress the two-way causality between human capital and in-
equality, on the one hand, and economic growth on the other. The success of
the export-oriented development strategy was more labor and skill demand-
ing. As higher growth was achieved, a higher GDP led to higher investments
per pupil, higher educational quality, lower income inequality, and lower ab-
solute levels of poverty. On the other hand, the unequal distribution of the
quantity and quality of education in Latin America led to forgone opportu-
10This assumption is implicit in many models of endogenous technological change. For
example, thi occurs when research in a continum of sectors contributes through an ex-
ternality to raise the leading technological frontier, in turn raising the productivity of
innovation investment for all sectors.
7nities in labor productivity and economic growth.
The two examples of interaction between economic growth and human
development can be explained in two ways by the model. A simple expla-
nation, not resorting to multiple steady states, is simply that policies, such
as promoting exports and technology adoption, matter for the success of
the productive sector under globalization. When higher rates of technolog-
ical change are achieved, improvements in production raise the returns to
education and the resources available for human capital investment.
A second, deeper explanation is the following. Latin America remained
in a lower steady state, with lower returns to human capital, because of its
higher levels of initial inequality, and because it followed a strategy of import
substitution that not only did not promote trade but also depended on unreg-
ulated FDI that crowded out innovation. In contrast, East Asia converged to
development. Enjoying lower levels of initial inequality, it followed a careful
globalization strategy featuring export promotion and technology adoption,
and experienced miracle growth as it changed steady state to become a suc-
cessful global partner in trade and development, with high returns to human
capital. It is worth noting that the larger East Asian countries, Japan, Korea
and Taiwan, jealously nurtured their technological independence and avoided
dependence on FDI.11,12 A change of steady state perspective for East Asia
is supported in detail in Wan’s (2004) comparative country case studies.
An additional result that emerges from jointly analyzing human devel-
opment and economic growth is a tension between the policy preferences
of the skilled and unskilled. Assume that both human capital investment
and innovation require government support. Skilled workers will favor in-
novation. Increases in productivity will raise the returns to human capital,
while extraordinary returns to skills will fall with human capital investment
on the unskilled. In contrast, unskilled workers favor human capital invest-
ment. This unlocks productive capabilities without the need for technological
11To the contrary, Singapore, a small country, promoted FDI by consistently underpric-
ing its human capital. Hong Kong’s development is based on geographical advantages for
trade: an excellent natural harbour ideally situated to serve Paciﬁc and China-West trade.
12An example of innovation crowding out is provided by the automotive industry. Eu-
rope and America, original inventors of the automobile, produce, import and export au-
tomobiles. Japan and Korea, which did not allow foreign production of automobiles, only
produce and export their own brands. In contrast, Latin America, an FDI host in auto-
mobiles, did not develop its own automobiles (Table 1, Mayer-Foulkes, 2006b, data from
ILO 2000).
8change. Under the skilled workers’ preferred policies, the human development
trap will persist. Under the unskilled workers’ preferences, human capital
investment will be carried out at the cost of worsening the country’s rela-
tive technological lag. By entrenching the economy in a lower steady state,
this could make emerging from underdevelopment impossible. In addition,
once the human capital trap is overcome, government support will have to
change its focus to technological change. This may require quite a strong
institutional and policy shift, as occurred in the ex-socialist countries. The
tension between policies to help the poor (here modeled as human capital
investment) and policies for economic growth (here modeled as investment in
technological change) is a signiﬁcant problem in Latin America, as in much of
the underdeveloped world. According to the model, both extremes generate
inferior policies. However, in practice the two objectives can intersect: gen-
erating human capital to support technological change for export promotion
is an example of an optimal combination.
What does the model conclude? First, no asymmetric assumptions be-
tween countries (for example in geography or institutions) are necessary to
show the existence of multiple steady states under globalization – develop-
ment and underdevelopment. The usual assumptions used in models of trade
and endogenous technological change suﬃce, since they can explain the allo-
cation of production and therefore innovation across countries by trade and
FDI. Second, increasing returns in human capital is not a necessary condi-
tions for a human capital poverty trap to exist. It is enough if a large enough
portion of families cannot endow their children with human capital – due
to incomplete or malfunctioning markets. The ensuing undersupply will lead
to extraordinary returns to skills and the population will divide into two
classes, whose diﬀerent living standards will evolve in parallel according to
each country’s technological level.
When these phenomena – human development, trade and innovation
– are analyzed together, multiple steady states in human and technolog-
ical development emerge that coexist under globalization. At the highest
steady states the human development trap has disappeared and high levels
of technology are enjoyed. At lower steady states the human development
trap may persist and low levels of technology cannot be escaped. A diversity
of growth experiences, including the likelihood in underdeveloped countries
of pro-rich and pro-poor policy regimes, that is consistent with the true-life
physiognomy of development and underdevelopment, results.
91.5 Does globalization yield development?
We now let the model answer the questions that motivated this chapter.
Why was export promotion better than import substitution? Because
high level technologies are based on innovations that require world-market
incentives. Domestic markets of all but the largest countries cannot hope
to support the innovative capacity of leading economies involved in world
trade. The purposeful, strategic policies promoting exports and technology
adoption that East Asian economies followed, supplied large markets and fed
their economic growth.
Why have the results of liberalization been meager? Because globaliza-
tion, that is, openness to trade and foreign investment, will not automatically
lead to development. Success depends on economy size, human resource lev-
els, and on implementing policies promoting exports and technology adop-
tion. Other determinants of aggregate production, such as institutional and
ﬁnancial development, also aﬀect steady state membership.
What role does the high level of inequality in Latin America play? In-
equality, representing the presence of a human development trap and low
human resource levels, is a determinant of steady state membership. In its
presence, and in the absence of policies truly promoting competitive tech-
nologies for the global market, development is impossible.
Why do millions not believe in market-guided policies? Because millions
of people are subject to an intergenerational poverty trap that exists precisely
because it is impervious to market forces. (This and the following statement
are consistent with rational expectations.)
W h yi sg l o b a l i z a t i o np e r c e i v e da su n f a i r ?B e c a u s ei tp r o v o k e si n n o v a t i o n
imbalances and innovation crowding out favoring advanced countries.
Where to go from here? Globalization is a necessary condition for devel-
opment. But it is not suﬃcient. What is required is to govern globalization
through policies compensating the long-term imbalances it creates, favoring
successful integration of weaker economies, promoting technology transfer,
encouraging exports from lagging countries, bolstering universal knowledge
integration. China has been successful at regulating trade and FDI, to ensure
its own growth in the process of integration. To extend such arrangements
for mutual beneﬁt to the many smaller countries, global governance and
regulation are required. Macroeconomic measures for achieving control and
coordination with the same objectives may exist as well, to be implemented
as a part of global governance.
10Furthermore, the trade and innovation model discussed here shows that
development is not a zero sum game. Leading countries’ welfare depends
essentially on the world growth rate, and this is maximized when the world
is fully developed. This can only occur when human development is achieved
everywhere and every country enjoys its full share of innovation. Concerted
nutrition, health, skills, know-how, research and infrastructure transfers to
the underdeveloped word are therefore in the interest of leading countries,
and constitute an instrument for global prosperity and peace.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a con-
cise, simple economic model deﬁning a dynamic human development trap
which is then interacted with economic growth. The results are summa-
r i z e dv e r b a l l y . T h e n ,t h ew o r l dg r o w t hr a t e ,a n dt h ee ﬀects of opening to
globalization, particularly on the poor, are discussed. Section 3 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Our discussion in the section on human development leads to the following
stylized facts about long-term human development. First, technological im-
provements lead to technophysio evolution; improvements in stature, health
and longevity. Second, higher human development provides inputs for rais-
ing technological levels. Third, the presence of market failures inhibits the
human capital investment that each new generation must make to achieve
current levels of human development; only the wealthier part of the popula-
tion may reach the human development potential that is currently possible,
while the poorer part may remain trapped away from achieving its full poten-
tial. Here we formalize these ideas in a concise economic model of a human
development trap and its interaction with economic growth.
A classical example of a static human capital trap is provided by Galor
and Zeira (1993). This trap is based on the need for an indivisible investment
for acquiring skills, and on the presence of a credit constraint not allowing the
poor to make the investment. I take this model, as presented in Basu (2003,
section 3.4), as point of reference to construct a dynamic human development
trap model.
112.1 The human development trap model
This section of the model appears in Mayer-Foulkes (2007). Thus here only
the necessary elements to understand it are included. Consider an econ-
omy with St skilled workers, each with human capital At, so that the ag-
gregate human capital stock is Ht = AtSt,a n dw i t hLt unskilled work-








t , with technology level also At. Φ is a ﬁxed
productivity eﬀect. Wage rates for labor and human capital are therefore
given by wL
t = βΦAt (St/Lt)
1−β and wS
t =( 1− β)ΦAt (Lt/St)
β,a n da r e
proportional to At. Note that increasing returns to human capital are not
assumed in the model. Instead, what is assumed is that an undersupply of
human capital, which will result from barriers to its acquisition, results in a
higher, endogenous wage gap between skilled and unskilled wages.
In period t, each young person receives a bequest xt, and decides whether
to invest hAt units in acquiring an indivisible package of At+1 units of human
capital consisting of ECD, health and education (“becoming skilled”).13 The
alternative is to work earning ηwL
t ,w h e r e0 < η ≤ 1 represents the ratio of
child to adult wages. Any remaining bequest is saved and earns an interest
rate r. For simplicity, a the credit market is assumed to be missing: it
is impossible to borrow to acquire nutrition, health and education. In the
second period of life, each adult earns yt+1, the sum of her skilled or unskilled
wage (wS
t+1 or wL
t+1) and accrued savings. Each adult consumes ct+1 and






HAt,0 < α < 1,
subject to the budget constraint ct+1 + bt+1 = yt+1. The utility function
contains two terms. The ﬁrst represents preferences over consumption and
bequests. The second term represents the non-labor beneﬁts of acquiring
health and education. δt takes the value 1 if skills and health capital were
acquired, and 0 otherwise, while uHAt (with uH constant) measures the non-
labor beneﬁts of human capital. For simplicity, so as not to include consump-
tion in both periods to deﬁn ead i s c o u n tr a t e ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sa s s u m e dt o
be exogenous.
13I assume technological change transforms both production and human capital. Thus,
At units of human capital acquired in youth become At+1 units of adult human capital.
Alternatively, let the package of At+1 units of human capital available to the young cost
hAt+1, and substitute h with hgt+1 in the results.
12A s s u m et h a tt h em o d e lp a r a m e t e r sa r es u c ht h a t1 )i n d e p e n d e n t l yo f
the ratio St/Lt of skilled to unskilled workers, anybody receiving a bequest
xt ≥ Ath will decide to acquire human capital; 2) given a technological level
At, skilled workers’s children can acquire skills and human development; 3)
the maximum feasible level of human development is bounded.
For now, suppose that the rate of technological change At+1/At =1+gt
is constant and exogenous, and deﬁne the deﬂated variable ˜ xt = xt/At.
Proposition 1. Under these assumptions, a higher steady state ˜ xHigh in
which skills are acquired exists. A lower steady state ˜ xLow in which skills are
not acquired also exists (see Figure 1) if the skilled to unskilled workers ratio





(1 + gt − (1 − α)(1 + r))h




In this case St and Lt remain constant. For higher growth rates gt,h i g h e r
skilled to unskilled ratios are necessary to escape the trap, and returns to
education are higher.
Figure 1 about here
The proof is in Mayer-Foulkes (2007), Appendix A. At both steady states,
wages rise with the technological level At, implying growing levels of nutri-
tion and health even for the unskilled. However, the unskilled population
is trapped away from reaching the full current human development poten-
tial, which is only accessible at the higher steady state. In this sense, the
model deﬁnes a dynamic poverty trap. The rising indivisible human capital
investment models successive investments at diﬀerent stages of development,
such as adequate nutrition, literacy, primary school, secondary school, higher
education, and so on, as mentioned above.
As long as the trap exists, children would like to borrow to acquire human
capital. Thus, investing in human capital oﬀers higher returns than the
interest rate, that is, extraordinary returns to investment.






13In the absence of a trap, all workers are skilled and wages for skilled and
unskilled labor will equalize (wL
t = wS
t ). Skilled and unskilled jobs will
be allocated in the ratio St/Lt =( 1− β)/β.I f t h e p o p u l a t i o n n u m b e r s





β(1 − β)1−βNt. T h i si st h eo p t i m a l
level for HRt and its higher bound. Instead, when a human development
trap holds, HRt will be lower and production less eﬃcient.
If the dynamic trap condition (1) does not hold, a prolonged transition
may nevertheless take place, in which several generations must pass before
the oﬀspring of a poor dynasty achieve the full human development poten-
tial. Under a prolonged transition, incomplete markets slow the transition
to a steady state through prolonged, systematic, under investment in human
capital. A transition under perfect markets would be faster.
2.2 Endogenous technological change
A simple equation for endogenous technological change is now stated.14 For






















The ﬁrst entry expresses that ﬁr m si n n o v a t em o r et h eh i g h e rt h e i rl e v e l
of production. It is assumed here that ﬁrms serve a demand proportional
to the world product, and that they innovate with certainty. Division by
At accounts for the ﬁshing out eﬀect: innovation at higher technological lev-
els is proportionally harder. φ is a constant including the propensity with
which income is invested in innovation, depending for example on institu-
tional arrangements. Decreasing returns to innovation investment in each
given sector is assumed, so 0 < γ < 1.15
The second entry expresses the impact of innovation allocation across
countries. Countries innovate on the sectors they produce for, whose mea-
sure is proportional to their productive capacity. We let proportionality
depend on a ﬁxed country eﬀect θ for country factors that may aﬀect inno-
vation races, and the corresponding average world parameter ¯ θ
World.A l s o ,
14Extended versions of this model are available in Mayer-Foulkes (2006a, 2006b).
15Note that under this simple speciﬁcation the returns to innovation are unbounded. It
will follow that the scale of resources applied to innovation has an unbounded eﬀect on
growth. However, under a more complex, bounded speciﬁcation, the scale eﬀect would be
bounded as well.
14there are innovation externalities between sectors. The more sectors a coun-
try innovates in, the higher the returns for innovation in each sector. This
means that specialization in a small number of sectors involves a disadvan-
tage. This assumption is especially credible in the case of a long-term model.
The degree of cross-sectoral externalities in innovation is given by κ.E x -
ternalities are absent if κ =0 ; in this case knowledge for production can
be completely specialized and a country needs no knowledge about sectors
it does not produce for. In the case κ =1 , aggregate technological change
equals average technological change in all sectors. This would be the case if
knowledge worked through a local leading technological edge resulting from
externalities from local innovation. It is assumed that κ lies somewhere in
between. In fact, it is assumed that γ < κ < 1, that is, that decreasing
returns to specialization hold, even in the presence of convergence forces.
That is, the negative eﬀects, for backward economies, of investing their in-
novation in a small segment of sectors will be stronger than the advantage
of backwardness due to convergence.
In the third entry, ¯ At is the leading technological edge, assumed here to
be generated in some other country or countries. Thus the economy we are
concerned with is a small, lagging country. Technology is assumed to rise
faster for lower relative technological levels at = At/ ¯ At,d u et ot e c h n o l o g y
transfer from leading countries, an advantage of backwardness eﬀect gener-
ating convergence (Gerschenkron, 1952). The functional form chosen here
assumes the convergence eﬀect is bounded by exp(χFT) as at becomes small.
This makes divergence in growth rates possible under autarchy.
U n d e ra u t a r c h y ,t h es a m ee q u a t i o ni sa s s u m e dt oh o l d ,w i t hY World
t re-
placed by Yt and ¯ θ

















It is reasonable to assume χA < χFT, i.e. that technology transfer works
less strongly under autarchy than under free trade, when not only ideas but
also goods travel between countries. Also, in the presence of comparative
advantage (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a), it can be assumed that the ﬁxed country
productivity eﬀects are higher under free trade than under autarchy, so ΦA <
ΦFT.16 Let λ = Y World
t / ¯ At and deﬁne 1+¯ g = ¯ At+1/ ¯ At.
16It is assumed throughout that a full human development potential is feasible both






















γ exp(χA − at)
(5)
where the human resource level HRtdeﬁned by (2) is used. This variable
deﬁn e sas c a l ee ﬀect in the equations governing technological change, de-
pending on eﬀective labor force. A more complete model might also include
a higher demand for human capital for innovation than for production.
The steady state found in Proposition 1 extends to a free trade or autarchic
steady state in relative technological levels if the relative technological level
at is also at a steady state. There are two types of steady states a∗.L e tHX
represent either HFT or HFT.T h eﬁrst type of steady state is a∗ =0 .T h i s
exists if and only if HX (0) < 1, because then limt→∞ at =0 .W h e nal a g g i n g
country approaches this type of steady state, its growth rate becomes lower











= HX (0)(1 + ¯ g) < 1+¯ g.
The second type of steady state occurs for 0 <a ∗ ≤ 1.I t e x i s t s w h e n
HX (a∗)=1 . The growth rate is then 1+¯ g, and the economy tends to a ﬁxed
technological lag a∗.
For ease of language, we say that at these two types of steady states
technology “diverges in growth rates” or “diverges in levels” (equivalently
“converges in growth rates”).
In the autarchic case, HA (at) is a decreasing function. At most a single
steady state exists. In the case of free trade, the following properties hold.
1) HFT (at) is a quasiconcave function.
2) HFT (0) = 0.
3) HFT (at) has a single maximum at at = κ − γ ∈ (0,1).
4) HFT is increasing in φ, θ/¯ θ
World, ΦFT, HRt, χFT, and decreasing in λ
and ¯ g.
under autarchy and free trade. However, under extreme conditions of comparative advan-
tage, the full human development potential may only be feasible under free trade, when
ΦA < h
(1−α)ε(β) < ΦFT. See condition (??) in Appendix A.
16For the proof of these properties, on which Proposition 2 and its Figures
2 and 3 are based, see Appendix A.
Figures 2 and 3 about here
Proposition 2. Under autarchy (Figure 2), a lagging country has the
following steady states, which depend only on its parameters.
A.1 If HA (0) ≤ 1, there is divergence in growth rates. The absolute rate
of growth tends from below to (φΦAHRt)γ exp(χA) < 1+¯ g.
A.2 If HA (0) > 1 and HA (1) < 1 there is a steady state 0 <a ∗ < 1 at
which the economy diverges in levels, with growth rate 1+¯ g.
A.3 If HA (1) > 1, the lagging country will overtake the leaders.
In case A.1, steady state growth rates, and in case A.2, steady state levels,
are increasing in the propensity to innovate φ, ﬁxed productivity eﬀects ΦA,
human resources HRt, and technology transfer rates as measured by χA.
Under free trade (Figure 3), the following dynamic conﬁgurations for a
lagging country exist. The steady states may depend on initial conditions as
well as parameters.
FT.1 If HFT(κ−γ) ≤ 1, the only stable steady state is a∗ =0 .T h el a g g i n g
country’s growth rate decreases towards 0. In the special case HFT(κ−γ)=
1 there is an unstable steady state a∗ = κ − γ, from which the economy
converges to a∗ =0under any negative perturbation.
If HFT(κ − γ) > 1, a stable and an unstable steady states a∗
0, a∗
1,e x i s t ,
satisfying 0=a∗
0 <a ∗
1 < κ−γ and HFT(a∗
0)=0 , HFT(a∗




FT.2 HFT(1) ≤ 1. A further stable steady state a∗




FT.3 HFT(1) > 1.I nt h i sc a s eHFT(at) > 1 on (a∗
1,1].
For initial values at0 <a ∗
1, the lagging country tends to a∗
0 =0 ,w h e r ei t s
growth rate descends to 0. For initial values at0 >a ∗
1, in case FT.2 the lagging
country tends to a∗
2, where it diverges in levels, with growth rate 1+¯ g.I n
case FT.3 it overtakes the leading economy. If the lagging country becomes a
leader, a new world or leading technological edge growth rate will emerge.
17It follows from property 4) of HFT that a) the higher the lagging country’s
propensity for innovation; b) the more sectors it dominates; c) the higher its
ﬁxed productivity eﬀects; d) the higher the level of human development the
more eﬃcient its allocation between skilled and unskilled labor; and e) the
higher the rate of technology transfer, the higher will its rate of technological
change be. The larger the world economy or its rate of growth, though, the
lower its relative steady state. At steady states divergent in growth rates or
levels, these comparative statics translates into growth or level eﬀects.
Note that backward countries may diverge in growth rates under free
trade even when they might converge to the leading growth rate under
autarchy. At any given level at, the relative growth rate under free trade



















that is, if the relative size of the aggregate product is high enough. In addi-
tion, if the lagging country is good at capturing innovation sectors (θ high),
enjoys high beneﬁts from comparative advantage (Φκ
FT suﬃciently larger than
Φ
γ
A), and if technological transfer under trade is suﬃciently high (χFT suﬃ-
ciently larger than χA), growth will tend to be higher under trade. Policies
for human development will raise HtRt and contribute to the viability of
growth under free trade.
Promoting exports and technological change, as well as concentrating on
comparative advantage (that is, raising θ, χFT and Φκ
FT), also contribute to
growth under free trade. Steady state membership also depends on institu-
tional and ﬁnancial development, which can raise aggregate production.
One deﬁning characteristic of the economic unit whose size is referred to
by the model, is that it shares knowledge for production and for skill forma-
tion. One policy for breaking the size constraint is therefore knowledge in-
tegration. Integration through trade and investment must be complemented
by integration in education and technology.
Under autarchy, the behavior of the lagging country only depends on its
parameters. Instead, under free trade its initial conditions matter. If they
are low enough, a lagging country will diverge in growth rates.
The following corollary restates the results to bring out the role of human
development in economic growth and globalization (proof in Appendix A).
18Corollary 3. The following conclusions about globalization and human
development hold.
HD.1 If human resources HRt in the lagging country are too low, it will
necessarily diverge in growth rates. A minimum level HRt for converging in






(1 + ¯ g)λ
κ−γ
φ
γ(κ − γ)κ−γ exp(χFT − κ + γ)
.
HD.2 Growth will only be faster under free trade than under autarchy
if human resources HRt are suﬃciently high, as in (6); otherwise too many
innovation sectors will be lost to trading partners.
HD.3 Economic growth performance is better for higher levels of human
resources HRt. At steady states divergent in growth rates or levels, higher
human resources HRt translate into growth or level eﬀects. For higher human
resource levels HRt, the lagging country is more likely to converge rather than
diverge in growth rates, since the threshold level a∗
1 is lower.
HD.4 If a government carries out policies for human capital investment
for the children of the unskilled, a steady state can only occur once human
resources reach their maximal level HRt = β
β(1 − β)1−βNt and the human
development trap has disappeared. Under autarchy, the economy will even-
tually converge to a steady state diverging in levels only. Under free trade,
the feasibility for convergence in growth rates will occur only if from some
time on, at >a ∗
1,w i t hHRt = β
β(1 − β)1−βNt.
HD.5 An economy converging to a∗
2 will be able to achieve human devel-
opment. However, human capital equality does not guarantee development.
2.3 Summary of results
The propositions concentrate on lagging countries. In the autarchic case, a
single stable steady state exists, independently of initial conditions. Coun-
try parameters and the level of human development determine whether the
lagging country diverges in growth rates, diverges in levels, or overtakes the
leading economy. It is assumed that convergence forces are bounded, making
divergence possible under autarchy as well.
In the case of free trade, small economies can only innovate in a handful of
sectors, with a consequently low rate of technological change. Thus, for low
country parameters and/or low levels of human development, divergence in
19growth rates is the only steady state. For higher parameters or levels of hu-
man development, lagging economies with suﬃciently high initial conditions
will either converge in levels or overtake the leading economy.
There is a scale eﬀect inherent in the technological change model. How-
ever, this eﬀect is unbounded only for mathematical tractability. If innova-
tion rates are bounded, so will the scale eﬀect. Because of the scale eﬀect,
the relevant measure translating human development into growth is human
resources, meaning aggregate units of combined skilled and unskilled labor.
Under a human development trap, human capital undersupply will reduce
aggregate human resources. Human resources aﬀect economic growth under
free trade as follows. First, productive eﬃciency will be higher for higher
levels of human resources, increasing resources for innovation. Second, there
is a minimum level of human resources needed for convergence in growth
rates. If these are too low, the lagging country will necessarily diverge in
growth rates. Third, there is also a minimum human resource requirement
for growth to be faster under free trade than under autarchy; otherwise too
many innovation sectors will be lost to trading partners. Hence, at steady
states diverging in growth rates or levels, higher human resources translate
to higher growth rates or levels. Fourth, lagging countries are more likely
to converge rather than diverge in growth rates for higher levels of human
resources. Fifth, a successful development path will be able to achieve hu-
man development. On the other hand, since the level of human development
depends on the level of technology, equality does not of its own guarantee
development.
The presence or absence of government human capital investment raising
the skilled to unskilled ratio St/Lt is a condition of the steady state. A human
development trap can only exist at steady state if there is no human capital
investment for the poor. Conversely, if there is human capital investment,
St/Lt will rise until the human development trap disappears before a steady
state can be reached. Beginning from low levels of development, even if it is
feasible to reach a developed, higher technology steady state, too much or too
little investment in human capital may make this impossible. Even if human
capital equality is achieved, underdevelopment may persist, with technologi-
cal levels diverging in levels or growth rates from leading countries. A careful
balance is needed between supporting human capital investment – an es-
sential component of growth – and a favorable insertion in globalization, to
reach high technological levels.
202.4 Optimal world growth rate
It has been assumed above that only research in leading countries advances
the leading technological edge. This is a reasonable assumption for coun-
tries lagging suﬃciently far behind. However, when countries converge to
the leading countries, eventually their research will also push the leading
technological edge. In this case, under trade, the world growth rate will rise.
Since the leading countries’ welfare increases with the world growth rate,
convergence of the underdeveloped countries is in their long-term interest.
This result is proved formally in Mayer-Foulkes (2006a, 2006b).
2.5 The impact of opening to globalization
The liberalization policies applied in Latin America take the form of a tran-
sition from an autarchic to an open steady state. This is costly in itself. I
discuss here some implications of this process, particularly on poverty.
First, the model predicts dramatic structural economic change, as does
any trade model. Many productive sectors will disappear as the economy spe-
cializes in its most productive tradeable sectors, which must be competitive
in world markets. The expected magnitude of this process of specialization
is large for any economy in Latin America. The reason is that the share of
world-competitive sectors can at most be proportional to productive capac-
ity and is therefore small. If in practice commercial integration is regional
rather than global, less sectors will be lost, but those remaining will have less
market power and therefore less incentives for innovation.
The reform process has usually been very fast. Economies have been
subjected to a large, multifaceted shock, structured as follows. In non world-
competitive sectors, capital and human capital loose value and unskilled
labor demand falls. In sectors receiving FDI by higher technology foreign
ﬁrms, competing domestic ﬁrms tend to be displaced. Skilled and unskilled
labor demand will depend on the speciﬁc FDI sectors involved. In world-
competitive domestic sectors, or in sectors supplying FDI, volume, innovation
incentives, and labor demand will tend to increase, with possible bottlenecks
in specialized human capital. Summing up, it is likely that there will be a
negative initial shock to unskilled wages, with some skilled wages rising. To
this must be added a series of transition costs and risks, whose impact can
be very high for the poor. It is no surprise that this process of sudden change
has given rise to volatility and ﬁnancial crises.
21This is where the predictions of trade models based on competitive pro-
duction end. The expected beneﬁts are short- and medium- term gains in
comparative advantage, with sketchy links to further economic growth. The
present model points out that the longer-term success of opening to trade
and FDI depends on the success of innovation in surviving domestic sectors.
However, the reforms have not planned for this. Instead, the results have
been left “to the market”. To be successful, sectors with comparative advan-
tage that have been supplying only the domestic market should now not only
preserve this advantage in the face of foreign technological improvement, but
grow to become innovative, world suppliers! With little or no investment
in public physical, human or research infrastructure, and scant negotiation
for spillovers from FDI. Though the future wealth of the population depends
on these sectors, these disadvantages and neglect translate into even lower
initial conditions.
The panorama of the impact of globalization coincides with the model
predictions. Positive and negative impacts are distributed with great vari-
ance across sectors, regions and countries. Inequality tends to rise, with
increased insecurity and a very real risk of falling into poverty for those em-
ployed in unlucky sectors or regions, or those who need to bear the costs of
transition or retraining. The poor require safety nets and appropriate social
protection schemes. Resulting inequality may lead to conﬂict and diﬃcul-
ties for growth. Firms in successful sectors may be too small to face the
challenge of multinational marketing chains, and obstacles may occur to ﬁrm
size, an important determinant of world-competitiveness. As successful sec-
tors suddenly require new technologies to increase production, the tendency
to use ready-made technologies from abroad suited to higher levels of skills
will result in skill-biased technological change and ineﬃciencies.
3F i n a l r e m a r k s
The model presented here explains persistent income inequality between and
within countries, compares import substitution and export promotion, and
accounts for episodes of miracle growth. It shows that development and
underdevelopment can coexist as steady states in the context of globalization.
The results rely on just two types of market imperfections, both of which
are commonly accepted facts. Increasing returns to education or in produc-
tion are not assumed. The ﬁrst type of imperfection are incomplete markets
22in human capital investment. Children are not endowed by the market with
their human capital investment, in spite of its notable returns. Instead, initial
conditions in wealth determine the incidence of investment. This problem
can result in a human development trap that subdivides the population into
classes and can persist under economic growth. Strong evidence for the pres-
ence of such a trap in Mexico is provided by Mayer-Foulkes (2007). Surely
this is not an isolated phenomenon.
The second type of imperfection is market power derived from innovation.
To remove any doubt on the relevance of market power, note that aggregate
world exports in 1998 amounted to US $7 trillion, while aggregate sales from
foreign aﬃliates of transnational corporations amounted to US $11 trillion
(UNCTAD, 1999). The combined sales of the top 200 corporations were
higher in 2000 than the combined economies of all countries minus the biggest
9; that is, they surpassed the combined economies of 182 countries (Anderson
and Cavanagh, 2000). Property rights over innovation, and the resulting
market power, are considered a condition for its existence. As has been
explained, under free trade the corresponding assumptions in the theory of
endogenous technological change, including innovation externalities between
sectors, imply the existence of multiple steady states (Mayer-Foulkes, 2006a,
2006b).
The fact that human development and technological change, the main
processes of economic growth, are subject to market imperfections, results in
the existence of a diverse set of steady states: widely varying incomes and
growth rates, episodes of miracle growth (understood as transitions between
steady states), economic growth without inequality reduction, positive and
negative impacts of trade on growth, convergence to parallel growth paths
of a large group of countries, long-term divergence and stagnation, pro-rich
and pro-poor policy regimes. Thus the theoretical model explains the broad
physiognomy of economic growth.
The idea that under globalization resources will ﬂow so that economies
equalize is based on the predominance of competitive markets. If this were
the reality, the Great Divergence would not have occurred, and development
would have spread equally around the world since its origins. For, what forces
could keep competitive markets so out of balance?
Sound global economic policies must recognize the powerful impact of
these market imperfections in human development and innovation. Global-
ization – free trade and FDI – generates innovation imbalances that must
be compensated for lagging countries to develop. It is a matter of experience
23that countries that have implemented complementary measures promoting
their exports and regulating FDI, so as to develop their technological capa-
bilities, have been able to achieve sustained economic growth for long periods,
that is, miracle growth. When this has occurred, as in the case of the Asian
tigers and China, both the countries involved and their commercial partners
have beneﬁted. Such policies can be implemented by individual countries or
regions. However, it would be optimal if they were carried out as an inte-
gral part of global governance. The very institutions that regulate trade and
investment, WTO, IMF and the World Bank, must commit to balance the in-
centives for innovation and technological change, to ensure that globalization
brings economic development for all.
The model shows that in the presence of a human development trap there
is a natural policy conﬂict between emphasizing human development or tech-
nological change. Both extremes have their problems. If only technological
change is pursued, the human development trap can persist. From this point
of view, the UN Millennium Development Goals are an essential components
of economic growth. Instead, if only human capital investment is pursued,
the technological lag may become too large for development to be feasible.
Eventually a policy change will become inevitable.
Development is not a zero-sum game. It is in the economic interest of
leading countries to foster productive and innovative capabilities around the
world. The world growth rate is maximal when all countries are developed.
Successful technology transfer and adoption will raise economic growth in
both lagging and leading countries. In turn, economic growth will incre-
ment the incentives and the resources to dismantle the human development
trap, liberating vast economic and human potential. Making globalization
successful for all will provide a foundation for global peace and prosperity.
4 Appendix A
Properties of HFT (at). Observe that the function f (at)=a
κ−γ
t exp(1 − at)

















is positive for at < κ−γ and negative for at > κ−γ, with its unique maximum
at κ − γ.
24Proof of Corollary 3. Parts 1, 2 are proved in their statements. Part
3 follows directly from (5) and the properties of HFT (at), HA (at).P a r t
4 is evident as follows. So long as there is human capital investment the
ratio St/Lt will change. Hence a steady state cannot be reached until the
human development trap ceases to exist. Convergence in growth rates (or
divergence in levels) means reaching a steady state a∗
2.S i n c e a∗
2 >a ∗
1,a
converging trajectory must from some time on satisfy this inequality. The
ﬁrst statement in Part 5 follows from noting that at any point in such a
trajectory at some ﬁnite proportion of income can be invested in human
capital without compromising at >a ∗
1. Under this condition achieving human
development takes ﬁnite time. On the other hand, human capital equality,
or equivalently human development, is also possible at a lower, divergent,
steady state.
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Figure 1. Dynamic Human Development Trap. Children who inherit more 
than hAt (deflated to h) chose to be skilled. They earn higher wages and bequest 
more to their children. Wages for skilled and unskilled workers are endogenous 
and depend on the aggregate ratio of skilled to unskilled workers St/Lt. If this 
ratio lies below the critical level ηCrit, there is a trap, which otherwise disappears. 
Near the critical level ηCrit, workers receiving bequests below hAt will go through 
a prolonged transition towards the higher steady state. Human development is 
“viable and bounded” when steady state 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of Technological 
Change under Autarchy. The diagram 
shows the three cases that arise for the 
case of autarchy in Proposition 2: A.1, 
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Figure 3. Dynamics of Technological 
Change under Free Trade. The diagram 
shows the three cases that arise for the 
case of free trade in Proposition 2: FT.1, 
FT.2 and FT.3. 
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